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Egypt Wrestles with Democracy:  




Thus far, the definition of democracy in Egypt is simply “not the current regime.” Indeed as 
according to experts, the Cairo protest was revolutionary because for the first time, the people 
are taking responsibility of their government and embracing notions of a need to do something 
about it. Democracy is thought to encompass “individual freedom and identity, diversity, 
[political and economic] competition, [popular sovereignty], and political accountability” 
(Tessler 2007, 109). Within the revolution, Egypt’s focus was on change in society and politics 
(Ambassador Boker Balaz, September 10, 2011, conversation with author).  In particular, Egypt 
wanted an end to Mubarak’s thirty-year rule, and wanted to get rid of its current constitution. As 
the Middle East’s “population and intellectual leader,” Egypt is in a unique position to 
demonstrate successful democratization in the Arab world (Roskin and Coyle 2008, 292).  
Now that Mubarak is overthrown, the world seeks to examine how Egypt’s expectations 
align with that of their reality, even though Egypt’s expectations are more so vaguely defined 
than they are clearly defined once culture is taken into account. Now as Egypt’s military 
currently governs the county, the world seeks to examine how the debate behind Egypt’s ability 
to democratize will play out. The country is at a very critical point where praetorianism (or more 
accurately, anarchy) and democratization are battling it out. At this critical point, the country can 
easily slip back into authoritarianism. 
Moreover regarding Egypt’s fragile political state, Egypt’s political history can further 
exacerbate this slip back into authoritarianism, which is not in favor of successful 
democratization. Egypt’s political history poses the greatest impediment to Egypt pursuing a 
democratic form of governance on account of its numerous cycles of authoritarian rule. 
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Democratization may prove a challenging development for Egypt because they have democratic 
rule to refer to in their history. In the eyes of its political history and current actions taken, 
military rule is not viewed positively toward shaping democracy given that Egypt has had 
military dictatorships in the past. This strong predominance of authoritarianism in Egypt’s 
history and culture could explain the misconnection between where Egypt wants to be versus 
where they currently are now in democratizing.  
FIRST OFF, WHAT HAPPENED? A LOOK AT THE APRIL 6 YOUTH MOVEMENT AND OVERTHROW OF 
MUBARAK 
The April 6 Movement is a small group of secular Egyptian students who organized and 
led the revolution in Egypt overthrowing Mubarak in a matter of 18 days (Egypt’s Facebook 
Faceoff, PBS, February 22, 2011). The group was initially formed in 2008 to stand by a textile 
workers’ strike against low wages and increased food prices (Egypt’s Facebook Faceoff, PBS, 
February 22, 2011). As indicated on April 6 Movement’s group page on Facebook, the group 
describes themselves as the following: 
 We are a group of Egyptian Youth from different backgrounds, age and trends gathered 
since the renewal of hope in 6 April 2008 in the probability of mass action in Egypt 
which allowed all kind of youth from different backgrounds, society classes all over 
Egypt to emerge from the crisis and reach for the democratic future that overcomes the 
case of occlusion of political and economic prospects that the society is suffering from 
these days. 
Most of us did not come from a political background, nor participated in political or 
public events before 6 April 2008 but we were able to control and determine our direction 
through a whole year of practice seeking democracy in our country - Egypt.  
April 6 primarily used social media to reach their targeted population for mobilization: young, 
educated but unemployed people (Egypt’s Facebook Faceoff, PBS, February 22, 2011). April 6 
gained 78,000 members in a very short amount of time on Facebook, and 6,000 protestors were 
arrested on the day of the protest (Egypt’s Facebook Faceoff, PBS, February 22, 2011). April 6 
studied the revolution in Tunisia and the non-violent Serbia and Ukrainian student protests 
(Egypt’s Facebook Faceoff, PBS, February 22, 2011).  
In Egypt, approximately 60 percent of the population is under age the age of 30, many of 
whom are educated yet unemployed (Alterman 2012, B9). This clearly aligns with Huntington’s 
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(2006, 48) observation that “the higher the level of education of the unemployed, alienated, or 
otherwise dissatisfied person, the more extreme the resulting destabilizing behavior.” Kimenyi 
(2011, 1) agrees with Huntington using sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset who said that “the 
demand for democracy is a result of broader processes of modernization and development. In the 
long run, it is very difficult for societies that have attained high living standards to tolerate living 
under autocratic regimes.” Kimenyi (2011, 1) also points out that once a significant percentage 
of the population has access to education, it becomes more difficult for elites “to continue to 
justify the exclusion of resources and privileges to the general population.”   
Furthermore, Kimenyi (2011, 1) greatly observes that indeed, the Egyptian revolution 
was led by young college graduates forming the country’s middle class “that [are] no longer 
willing to live under semi-feudal autocrats.” However, the high rate of unemployment makes 
reading “emerging middle class” rather difficult; and yet it is plausible that this unemployment 
could also be because the significantly inequitable income distribution that is present in Egypt. In 
Egypt, approximately 40.5 percent of the population is poor (Nawar 2007).  Also, these recent 
college graduates or “emerging middle class” have access to technology and digital information, 
whereas the mass does not. Currently in the Middle East, including Egypt, there are only the elite 
and then there are the masses, neither of whom would suggest a revolution.  
April 6 selected January 25, 2011 as the official protesting day because that day in Egypt 
is Police Day, and that day followed briefly after Tunisia overthrew their president. April 6’s 
demands during the protests were as follows:   
Mubarak must immediately resign. 
The national assembly and senate must be dissolved. 
A “national salvation group” must be established that includes all public and political 
personalities, intellectuals, constitutional and legal experts, and representatives of youth 
groups who called for the demonstrations on Jan. 25 and 28. This group would form a 
transitional coalition government for a transitional period. The group would also form a 
transitional presidential council until the next presidential elections. 
A new constitution must be written to guarantee the principles of freedom and social 
justice. 
Those responsible for killing of hundreds of ‘martyrs’ in Tahrir Square must be 
prosecuted. 
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Detainees must be released immediately. (Egypt’s Facebook Faceoff, PBS, February 22, 
2011)  
Interestingly during the protest, everything stopped for prayer and then the protest resumed. This 
indicated great respect for culture, even though the organizers themselves were secularists. As 
Benson and Snow (2000, 621-622) point out, the more relatable the movements’ framings are to 
the daily experiences and cultures of targeted populations, “the greater their salience, and the 
greater the probability [and prospect] of mobilization.” With that in mind, it is also important to 
point out that numerous groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, participated and helped lead 
the protests at Tahrir Square. Political diversity, an element of democracy that Tessler 
mentioned, has merged in the fight to overthrow Mubarak.  
 During the 18 days of protest, Mubarak sent the military to contain protestors. Certainly 
in accordance to Brinton’s anatomy of a revolution, the military ultimately sided with the people 
and helped to overthrow Mubarak. Yet in Egypt, the army tends to side with the people – or the 
people tend to trust and count on the military.  
Haass (2011) states that Egypt’s revolution occurred because of three decades of 
Mubarak’s rule, planned hereditary of presidency, corruptions, and economic reforms not 
helping the majority of Egyptians.  Haass (2011) also notes that while some protestors in Egypt 
want complete democracy, the majority of Egyptians simply want a less corrupt government, 
greater ability to participate in politics, and a better economy than that of the overthrown regime.  
THE MIDDLE EAST (INCLUDING EGYPT’S) HISTORICAL SIDE TO DEMOCRACY 
Historically, Muslims concurred with equality with three exceptions:  slaves, women, and 
non-believers (Lewis 2011). For democratizing, “relevant orientations include both generalized 
support for democratic political forms and the embrace of specific democratic values, such as 
respect for political competition and tolerance of diverse political ideas” (Tessler 2007, 107). 
Given Muslims’ notable prejudices toward other religions through-out time even to this present 
day and predominance of authoritarianism in the Middle East, such “respect for political 
competition” and “tolerance of diverse political ideas” are rather questionable. Indeed, Christians 
and their various denominations and sects are granted protection status known as “dhimmi” in 
Arab countries, yet these non-Muslims are still discriminated against. “Further historical 
precedence for this unequal treatment is [this] role of dhimmi in Islamic empires: a non-Muslim 
could live in peace …[if] he accepted a second-class status, did not participate in certain 
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occupations, did not build a house larger than a Muslim neighbor’s, did not join the military, but 
did pay a higher tax” (Roskin and Coyle 2008, 13). In theory, while religion and politics remain 
rather separate in Western countries, Islam and politics are completely intertwined in Middle 
East countries. This lack of separation between church and state may suggest some degree of 
intolerance toward religions that the state is not intertwined with. Islam encompasses all aspects 
of life—business, political, and personal (Tessler 2007).   
When the Middle East speaks of good and bad government, they speak of justice versus 
injustice as opposed to freedom versus restrictions (Lewis 2011). Islamic tradition states that a 
just ruler has rightly obtained power and is required to righteously exercise that power (Lewis 
2011). It appears to be that to justly obtain power, the people may have to concur that the ruler is 
the rightful one, but Allah (or his Prophet) must approve of this ruler. Islamic tradition also 
stresses obedience for Muslims should “[o]bey God, obey the Prophet, obey those who hold 
authority over you” except “in sin;” then subjects have the responsibility to revolutionize and 
defy (Lewis 2011). Some experts believe that it is not possible for Egypt, along with other 
countries to democratize, because in Islam, Muslims stress that Allah is the ultimate authority.  
Egypt spoke of freedom or liberty within the realm of slavery and legalities as opposed 
realm of government and politics (Lewis 2011). In the Middle East, good versus bad government 
is more closely aligned with justice and injustice as opposed to liberties or freedom (Lewis 
2011). There were two points made concerning proper conduct of the government in relation to 
the ruler: 1) consultation, where the ruler adheres to “consultants” such as advisors, cabinet 
members, and any other sort of governmental body and vice-versa; and 2) consent and contract, 
where both rulers and subjects are accountable toward each other (Lewis 2011). One could think 
of these two points as a sort of checks and balances, since the “consultants” could very easily get 
rid of a ruler and subjects can ultimately overthrow a ruler. However, it is thought that 
modernization would lead to ending Islamic checks and balances because unlike in many 
Western governments, Islamic societies had many levels in-between restricting the ruler’s 
powers (Lewis 2011). Modernization typically gets rid of traditions (Roskin and Coyle 2008).  
Very importantly, Egypt has had millenniums of non-democratic rule. Their ancient era 
consisted of monarchies, military dictatorships, conqueror rule (including that of the Ottomans) 
and colonial rule (France and Britain) through various conquerors as well as original settlers until 
1952, when Abdul Nassar became the country’s leader (Roskin and Coyle 2008). Hence, Egypt 
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really does not have its political history to look to as a source for forming their democracy. Even 
under the rule of Nassar, “[t]here was no democracy; elections were fake” (Roskin and Coyle 
2008, 88). Then came the presidency of Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak after the assasination 
of Sadat. While, since 1952, presidents came to power by democractic means or processes, their 
rule and leadership have been authortarianist.   
Recently, right before the Egyptian revolution, many members of Muslim Brotherhood 
claimed to be “independent” to gain seats in Parliament, especially because the Brotherhood in 
itself is “still technically illegal for advocating Islamic rule […] The Brotherhood ran in only a 
third of the contests to avoid alarming the regime” (Roskin and Coyle 2008, 294). Muslim 
Brotherhood’s participation in politics, even if it meant to run as “independents,” signaled that 
Egypt is fed up with corrupted, authoritarian regimes. Optimistically, this could indicate that 
Egypt might successfully democratize.    
EGYPT’S EXPECTATIONS AND WHAT THEY WANT TO ACHIEVE 
As indicated above, the biggest challenge for democracy in the Middle East is history, for 
the predominance of authoritarianism would make democratizing a rather difficult, if not 
lengthy, process. As Tessler (2007, 108) quoted, “‘[d]emocracy is not attained simply by making 
institutional changes through elite-level maneuvering. Its survival depends also on the values and 
beliefs of ordinary citizens.’”  
According to Brown (2011, 129), “the opposition would like to see a whittling down of 
the powers of the presidency; firm institutional guarantees of judicial independence, largely in 
form of a more autonomous and powerful judicial council; judicial monitoring of elections; an 
end to exceptional courts and Egypt’s state of emergency; more robust instruments for protecting 
rights and freedoms; and a truly pluralist party system.” Brown (2011) suggests that while 
Egyptians may not exactly opt for an American-type of “checks and balances,” they tend to 
discuss a more literal “separation of powers.”  
Among the April 6 demands were that “a new constitution…be written to guarantee the 
principles of freedom and social justice;” that “a ‘national salvation group’ must be established 
that includes all public and political personalities, intellectuals, constitutional and legal experts, 
and representatives of youth groups who called for the demonstrations on Jan. 25 and 28;” and 
that “[t]hose responsible for killing of hundreds of ‘martyrs’ in Tahrir Square must be 
prosecuted.” April 6 is calling for equalities, political participations, and accountability. As 
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stressed above, Egypt’s idea of freedom differs than that of the United States’. Given that justice 
and injustice is referred to in terms of good government versus bad government in the Middle 
East, perhaps social justice indicates that the government treats all subject well and applies laws 
equally to all, regardless of a subject’s social characteristics or identity.  
Muslim Brotherhood, judiciary, and business sectors are expected to steer Egypt’s course 
over time (Cook 2011). During the eighties and nineties, the judiciary used their independence to 
“enforce some of the rights and freedoms embedded in the Egyptian constitution […] By 2005, 
parliament had one-fifth of its seats controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood” (Brown 2011, 127). 
Various sources suggest that judiciary could play a very significant role in resurfacing liberal and 
democratic aspects of constitutions (Brown 2011). As previously mentioned, younger leaders’ 
values include accountability, transparency, tolerance, and rule of laws as part of establish a new 
government of sorts in Egypt (Cook 2011). However, it is unknown precisely how liberal and 
pro-democratic the Muslim Brotherhood really is, if they sincerely are at all (Cook 2011).   
…VERSUS EGYPT’S REALITY: WHERE THEY REALLY ARE NOW  
Currently, Egypt is in a praetorian state, ruled by a military council of 18 members. 
According to The New York Times (NYT) (2011), the military “quickly suspended unpopular 
provisions of the constitution, even while cracking down on continuing demonstrations.” The 
military stated that they would step down once parliamentary and presidential elections are held 
at some point this fall, yet the people question the extent of the military’s loyalty to the 
revolution (NYT 2011). However, the military recently changed its mind and “planned to retain 
full control of the Egyptian government even after the election of a new Parliament begins in 
November” (NYT 2011). The military promised elections in September, but then postponed 
them until after Parliament elections, and after ratifying a new constitution (NYT 2011).  
The rights of women and Christians remain a serious issue in light of modernization 
(Cook 2011). Most recently, the burning of a church in Egypt led to ultimate clashes against 
military rule, Muslims and Coptic Christians. “Christians had joined the pro-democracy protests 
in large numbers, hoping for protections of a pluralistic, democratic state, but a surge in power of 
Islamists has raised fears of how much tolerance majority rule will allow” (Kirkpatrick 2011). A 
woman was quoted saying that “the military…was ‘trying to start a civil war’” (Kirkpatrick 
2011). A Christian man was quoted saying “‘…this is the issue of the freedom that we demanded 
and can’t find’” (Kirkpatrick 2011).  Certainly, as Huntington (2006) stated would happen, the 
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military won; the protest resulted in deaths of 24 Coptic Christians, and hundreds more people 
were injured. Note that historically, Muslims has valued equality, but not toward non-believers.  
If the radicals, or in the Middle East’s case, Islamists are expected to rise next to rule and govern, 
then this entrenchment of history plus the radicals’ beliefs could contradict the strive toward 
democracy as envisioned in the West and in Egypt’s Christians.   
Prior to this incident trials against Mubarak were held through-out August and September 
(NYT 2011). However, Field Marshal Tantawi “testified…in a closed hearing that disappointed 
prosecutors who had hope he would help determine whether the ousted Egyptian leader 
conspired to order the killing of unarmed demonstrators in his final days of power in February” 
(NYT 2011). It is generally believed that testimonies of key military leaders still loyal to 
Mubarak would ultimately let the former president get away with his most serious crimes. 
However, the fact that the former president is even standing trial is astonishing to fellow Arab 
countries (NYT 2011).  
Also in September, the military council essentially reinstated the “state of emergency” to 
allow investigations into judicial matters to break up further protests (NYT 2011). This is 
especially in light of the significant role that the judiciary typically plays in liberalizing (or one 
could say democratizing) Egypt. This reinstatement ran contrary to the military government’s 
word to get rid of the law, which was paramount to Mubarak’s rule. During Mubarak’s time, 
issuing a “state of emergency” permitted “arrest[ing] people without charge, detain[ing] 
prisoners indefinitely, limit[ing] freedom of expression and assembly, and maintain[ing] a 
special security court” (NYT 2011). This “state of emergency” certainly lies opposite of 
democracy – at least in light of the United States – where invasions of privacy and prohibiting 
free expressions and assembly run counter to democratic ideology. If anything, this reinstatement 
is a step backwards for Egypt in their pursuits toward a more democratic country. 
However, on October 26, 2011, two policemen were convicted of killing Kahled Said, the 
young man thought to spark Egypt’s revolution and who serves as its symbol (The Associated 
Press 2011). One article reports that the verdict was reached after evidence suggesting that the 
policemen indeed beat Said to death was presented (The Associated Press 2011).  “However with 
the light sentence, the lawyer Hafiz Abu-Saada said the court convicted the two of manslaughter, 
rejecting the more serious charge of murder or torture, as defined in international accords in 
which Egypt is a signatory” (The Associated Press 2011). Yet the people are taking this verdict 
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as a sign of some justice present within government, and believe that the verdict has still done 
right by Said (The Associated Press 2011).            
Considering the freedom of expression and assembly and the advocacy for a person done 
wrong, a very important element in democratic societies includes civil societies. Civil societies 
have various organizations (professional, non-profits, etc.), labor unions, clubs, associations, 
public entities such as libraries, churches, etc. However, Egypt currently has no civil society; the 
only place that any sort of discussion, organization, or expressions could take place is at a 
mosque (Roskin and Coyle 2008).  This could very well explain why observers currently see 
“organized Islam filling the vacuum” in absence of an authoritarian regime in Egypt (Roskin and 
Coyle 2008, 285). Lack of civil societies hinders the ability for a country to transition into 
“building the new democracy” (Kinsman 2011, 41) because there are no apolitical avenues in 
which political activities, formulations of political thought, and political participation are taking 
place. Civil society, with its vast diversity of services and beliefs, serves as an intermediary for 
democracy, especially for societies attempting to transition from authoritarianism.  
Also, there are no precedents or official procedures in place for how to formulate a new 
constitution (Brown 2011), especially if Egyptians desire public input. The New York Times 
(2011) suggests that developing and ratifying a new constitution in Egypt may take at least a 
couple of years, if not longer. Just as Huntington (2006) expressed, Egypt is currently 
experiencing rapid social movement accompanied by groups making slow changes.    
DEBATES AROUND A DEMOCRATIC EGYPT… THEN AGAIN, WHOSE “DEMOCRACY”? 
Generally, thought-of hindrances to establishing a democracy in Egypt as well as the 
Middle East as a whole include, but are not limited to deep roots of authoritarianism, lack of a 
civil society, and lack of Islamic political thought of what “citizenship” is or means (Lewis 
2011). In the PBS documentary Egypt’s Facebook Faceoff (aired February 22, 2011), no person 
examined discussed or mention what democracy meant while the term rolled out their mouths. 
With that in mind, another potential barrier to democracy includes culturally influenced 
orientation and perspective in relation to individualism versus group associations. Westerners 
tend to stress individual elements such as occupation when introducing themselves, while Middle 
Easterners tend to stress group identities such as family, religion, and ethnicity or nationality 
(Roskin and Coyle 2008).  Democracy tends to stress individualism, and freedoms and liberties 
for individuals to be unique, or be “their own person.” However, April 6 appears to demonstrate 
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the possibility to integrate group identities while stressing characteristics found in the democracy 
which they fight for: individuality and diversity. Note that in introducing themselves on web 
sites and social networking sites (Facebook), the first thing they say is “[w]e are a group of 
Egyptian Youth” but then they point out a couple of times that they come from diverse 
“backgrounds, age and trends [… and] society classes.” 
Roskin and Coyle (2008, 279) mentioned that “at a certain point during the 
modernization process, demands for democratization rise.” Usually poorer countries (whose 
GDP per capita is less than $5,000) failed to democratize, while better off countries (whose GDP 
per capita is more than $6,000) successfully democratized (Roskin and Coyle 2008, 279). The 
CIA World Factbook estimated GDP per capita for Egypt as of 2010 is $6,200 (in purchase 
parity power, or PPP). “Attempts at democracy in poor lands tend to fail as populist 
demoagogues or military officers turn themselves into authoritarian leaders” (Roskin and Coyle 
2008, 279). Based on income alone, modernization theory suggests that Egypt should 
successfully democratize, but its current praetorianism combined with the people’s typically 
extraordinary trust in the military could lead this attempt at democratization to fail, or military 
officers would have “turn[ed] themselves into authoritarian leaders.” The military has already 
reinstated “state of emergency,” and has postponed their said periods of temporary rule. 
Hopefully, effects of income and education levels in Egypt would override this potential failure.      
Lastly, an important barrier to democracy is the comprehension of this political ideology, 
particularly when it comes to one of its factors: elections. Much of the media highlights the 
Middle East’s emphasis on elections, and this view that elections are key to democracy. 
Democracy is much more than elections; as discussed above, another very important element of 
democracy includes civil societies, and well as embracing “individual freedom and identity, 
diversity, [political and economic] competition, [popular sovereignty], and political 
accountability” (Tessler 2007, 109). An election in itself can, and in many instances has, elected 
a dictator in power. Elections are not always fair, and as shown in Egypt’s political history, said 
elections are often fixed.     
Lewis (2011) suggests that items that could help with establishing a democracy in the 
Middle East as well as Egypt include the following: consensual, contractual and limited 
government; traditional refusal of despotism; permitting consultation; and usage of modern 
communications and its technology (Lewis 2011). It appears to be that the usage of modern 
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communications and its technology are well underway in Egypt, as April 6 used Facebook to 
mobilize protestors and Egypt’s local news sources are openly discussing doubts of military’s 
rule and sincere intentions.  
Lewis (2011) also suggests that grave threats to establishing a democracy in Egypt 
include tyrannies and Islamic fundamentalists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 
Brinton (1965) states that in revolutions, moderates actually organize the revolution, and then 
they are thrown out and radicals succeed them. In the case of the Middle East, these “moderates” 
are secular and these “radicals” are Muslim fundamentalists/Islamists. Brinton (1965) observes 
that extremists do not rule during typical times because of their inability to compromise. 
Currently, it is debatable if the Muslim Brotherhood is radical or extremist, but in Egypt their 
party has held seats in parliament but has not been in top power.  Also, like a typical extremist 
group, Muslim Brotherhood has experienced moments of suppression (Wickham 2011). Yet, 
Muslim Brotherhood seems to be compromising democracy with Islamism.   
Today, the timing and Egypt’s current situation has created a great opportunity for 
Muslim Brotherhood to be voted in into government. If the majority really had their way, 
chances are that the Brotherhood would have occupied the majority of seats in Parliament, and 
would be the ultimate executive power in Egypt (Roskin and Coyle 2008). “Its naïve but 
effective slogan ‘Islam in the Solution’ promised to solve all problems, from hunger and 
economic development to getting rid of the Americans and the Israelis. The Brotherhood is well 
organized and helps the poor with food, medical care, and community problems the regime 
neglects. Many Egyptians see the Muslim Brotherhood as the only hope for change” (Roskin and 
Coyle 2008, 294). Brinton (1965) notes that government tries to collect more money, which in 
cases of dictatorship, may include increased food prices. As shown, the Brotherhood combats 
this food insecurity, along with providing many other services that the regime failed to provide. 
It is expected that they will at least run on the platform that they serve “the people.”   
However, many sources reveal that the Muslim Brotherhood is announcing mixed stances 
on democracy and pluralism. At times, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders’ statements are even 
contradictory to each other. Factions within the Muslim Brotherhood make it difficult to take any 
one particular stance, especially when two of those factions involve the following: 1) willingness 
to work with secularists so long as it does not interfere with Islam, and 2) internally changing the 
group, even though such changes would be deemed too far from Islamic conservatism (Wickham 
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2011). However, they always go back to their basic stance that the country should be ruled in 
accordance to Shari’a law. Yet, as Lewis (2011) states, no one will know how liberal Muslim 
Brotherhood sincerely is (or is not) until they actually rule. For Muslim Brotherhood, indeed the 
ultimate question is if “supporting a transition to democracy as an end in itself or as a first step 
toward the ultimate establishment of a political system based not on the preferences of the 
Egyptian people but the will of God as they understand it” (Wickham 2011, 205).           
CONCLUSION: AS REVOLUTION EVOLVES, HISTORY WILL REMAIN ITS MOST SIGNIFICANCE 
OBSTACLE 
Huntington (2006) stated that invasion of foreign ideas spark revolutions. Especially if 
those foreign ideas are dramatically different than that domestically, the revolution is sparked 
only to be left with how to reconcile traditions starkly different than modernity. Such culturally 
ideological differences lead Egypt’s expectations of democratization to optimistically exceed that 
of reality. Yet, as “the [Arab] brains are in Cairo,” Egypt is key to figuring how to intertwine 
democracy with Islamic culture.   
However, revolutionary and modernization theory suggest that intellectual, educated, 
middle-income Egypt should be able to successfully democratize, under presumptions that the 
Muslim Brotherhood would adhere to their sayings that they will embrace diversity more.  This 
is very important if Egypt is to democratize, given that the majority would vote for Muslim 
Brotherhood, and Egyptians view them as the hopeful way of change.     
Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) (2011) Frontline article on the April 6 Movement 
ends with the following perfect demonstrations of Brinton’s (1968) observation—as moderates 
settle in, radicals take on the revolution and proclaim that the war has not yet been won, and 
demands of the people are not yet satisfied:  
In a Feb. 14, 2011 interview with NPR, April 6 founder Ahmed Maher talked about his 
message to followers about continuing the protest: “Those who are demonstrating have their own 
issues. We made the decision not to demonstrate while we wait for a response to our demands 
[for reform]. We can always go back to the street.” 
Yet activist Hossam el-Hamalawy sees the fight as far from over: “Activists can take 
some rest from the protest and go back to their well-paying jobs for six months, waiting for the 
military to give us salvation. But the worker can't go back to his factory and still get paid 250 
pounds. … [T]he mission is not accomplished.” 
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Note that the moderates are taking great credit for this successful overthrow, and that 
they are now taking the backseat. Essentially, they are handing the revolutionary reins to the 
more radical protestors. The quotation above also very well demonstrates that as of today, Egypt 
really is not where they do want to be, and its political history significantly widens this 
expectation of the democratizing process versus where the democratizing process actually stands. 
The greatest issue within the revolution to bring democracy to Egypt is the millennia of 
authoritarianism the country has had. In view of political history, the military’s current 
governance in Egypt is concerning because Egypt has had military dictatorships in the past 
especially considering some measures that the military has taken that are at odds with democracy 
such reinstating “state of emergency,” and postponing their said periods of temporary rule.  
The inability for history to repeat itself greatly rest on other factors thought to assist 
democratizing such a country’s income and education level, usage of modern communications 
and technology, tolerance toward diversity, presence of a civil society, and having a clear 
perspective or definition of “democracy” and “citizenship” to look up to. Without a formal 
understanding of “democracy” or presence of a nonpartisan, apolitical civil society, reality will 
continue to lag behind expectations.   
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